Abstract. We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structures, being structures where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of the coalition structure. Both types of communication restrictions are modeled by an undirected communication graph, so there is a communication graph between the unions of the coalition structure as well as a communication graph on the players in every union. We provide an axiomatic characterization using an efficiency, two types of fairness (one for each level of the communication structure), and a new type of axiom called union component balancedness which compares the effect of replacing a union in the coalition structure by one of its maximally connected components, on the payoffs of these components. We also show that, for particular two-level communication structures, the Owen value and the AumannDrèze value for games with coalition structures, the Myerson value for communication graph games and the equal surplus division solution appear as special cases of this new value.
Introduction
The study of TU games with coalition structures was initiated in the 1970's, first by Aumann and Drèze [1] and then Owen [9] . In these papers a coalition structure is given by a partition of the set of players. Later this approach was extended in Winter [12] to games with level structures. Another model of a game with limited cooperation presented by means of communication graphs was introduced in Myerson [8] . Various studies in both directions were done during the last three decades, but mostly either within one model or another. Vázquez-Brage, García-Jurado and Carreras [11] is the first study that combines both models by considering a TU game endowed with independent of each other both a coalition structure and a communication graph on the set of players. For this class of games they propose a solution by applying the Owen value for games with coalition structures to the Myerson restricted game of the game with communication graph.
Recently, Khmelnitskaya [6] and Kongo [7] independently from each other have introduced another model of a TU game endowed with both a coalition structure and communication graph, the so-called games with two-level communication structures. In contrast to [11] , in this model a two-level communication structure relates fundamentally to the given coalition structure and consists of a communication graph on the collection of the a priori unions in the coalition structure, as well as a communication graph within every union. It is assumed that communication is only possible either among the a priori unions or among single players within an a priori union. No communication and therefore no cooperation is allowed between single players from distinct elements of the coalition structure. Different from the framework of Khmelnitskaya, Kongo reduces the model to a one-level communication model using a special assumption concerning the ability of players to cooperate under the two-level communication structure, namely a set of players is able to cooperate either if it is a connected component within an a priori union or the set of players is the union of at least two connected a priori unions, independently whether the players are connected inside the a priori union they belong to or not.
In this paper we abide by the Khmelnitskaya's framework but we weaken the assumption concerning communication on the union level between a priori unions, allowing for one a priori union among connected unions to be represented by a proper subcoalition. When unions are negotiating for their share in the total payoff, their cooperation possibilities are restricted by the communication graph on the level of the unions. Also when a union is represented by a proper subset of the union, the cooperation possibilities of this representative subset with the other (full) coalitions are restricted by the communication graph on the level of the unions. Similarly, when players within a subcoalition within a union are negotiating for their share in the union payoff, their cooperation possibilities are restricted by the communication graph within the union. In all these cases, following Myerson, we assume that only connected participants are able to cooperate when the connectedness is determined by the corresponding underlaying communication graph. However, the players within the union always have to distribute the total payoff that has been assigned to the union in the game between the unions irrespectively of the existing communication links within the union. Also when a union is internally not connected, the total payoff assigned to the union still has to be distributed amongst its members. So, deviating from Myerson, we consider the union as an institution that allows their members to cooperate beyond the bilateral communication links within the union, but this concerns only the union as a whole.
In case all unions are internally connected, the payoff allocation will be determined by traditional efficiency and fairness axioms, in the context of the underlying model referred to as quotient component efficiency, quotient fairness and union fairness. In case a union is not internally connected, we introduce a new axiom, called union component balancedness, to describe the effect that still the total payoff assigned to the union has to be distributed amongst its members. Consider a particular component within a union that is not internally connected. Suppose we know the total payoff of that component when the union is replaced by just the players in this component (and thus this reduced union is internally connected). Doing this for every connected component of this union, and compare this with the payoff allocation when the full union is present, we can compare how the (positive or negative) excess is shared among the different components. According to union component balancedness this excess is shared proportional to the size of the component.
We show that the above mentioned four axioms characterize a new solution for the class of games with two-level communication structures. Different from the solution concepts given in [6] and [7] , the new solution is an Owen-type value in the sense that it modifies the Owen value for games with two-level communication structures. As in Owen [9] , the payoffs of the players are determined by applying the Shapley value twice. Namely, the individual payoff to a player is determined by the Shapley value applied to a game within the union the player belongs to. To construct the game within a union, first a game is obtained by applying Owen's procedure to find such a game but taking account of the communication graph between the unions. Next we construct a restriction of this game taking into account the communication graph within the union and apply the Shapley value to this restriction. As a corollary to this procedure we obtain the graph restricted analog of Owen's quotient game property when for each union the total payoff to the players of the union is equal to the Shapley payoff to this union in the Myerson restricted game (with respect to the communication graph between unions) of Owen's quotient game between the unions.
The new Owen-type value for the class of games with two-level communication structures is characterized by four axioms, two on the level of the communication graph between the a priori unions, and two on the level of the communication graphs within the a priori unions. We also show that the Owen value and the Aumann-Drèze value for games with coalition structures, the Myerson value for communication graph games and the equal surplus division solution appear as special cases of this new value for particular two-level communication structures. The paper is organized as follows. Basic definitions and notation are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the axioms that we require from a solution for games with two-level communication structures. In Section 4 we define an Owen-type value for such games and show that it is the unique solution satisfying these axioms. In Section 5 we consider several special cases and show that the new solution generalizes some well-known solutions for games in coalition structure and communication graph games.
Preliminaries

TU games and values
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperating can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU game, being a pair N, v , where N ⊂ IN is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and v : 2 N → IR is a characteristic function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e., the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoff of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. We denote the set of all characteristic functions on player set N by G N . For simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of N, v . The subgame of v with respect to a player set T ⊆ N , T = ∅, is the game v| T defined as v| T (S) = v(S), for all S ⊆ T . We denote the cardinality of a given set A by |A|, along with lower case letters like n = |N |, m = |M |, n k = |N k |, s = |S|, c = |C|, c = |C |, and so on. For K ⊂ IN, we denote IR K as the k-dimensional vector space which elements x ∈ IR K have components
For every x ∈ IR N and S ⊆ N , we use the standard notation x(S) = i∈S x i and x S = {x i } i∈S .
For game v ∈ G N , a vector x ∈ IR N may be considered as a payoff vector assigning a payoff x i to each player i ∈ N . A single-valued solution, called a value, is a mapping ξ that assigns for every N ⊂ IN and every
value is the Shapley value [10] , given by
Games with coalition structure
A coalition structure on N ⊂ IN is given by a partition P = {N 1 , ..., N m } of N . Elements of a partition will be called a priori unions. Let C N denote the set of all coalition structures on N . A pair v, P ∈ G N × C N constitutes a game with coalition structure. A game with coalition structure represents situations in which a priori unions are formed. For partition P = {N 1 , . . . , N m }, we denote M = {1, . . . , m} and for every i ∈ N , we denote by k(i) the index of the a priori union containing player i, so k(i) is defined by the relation i ∈ N k(i) . For any payoff vector x ∈ IR N , let x P = x(N k ) k∈M ∈ IR M be the corresponding vector of total payoffs to the a priori unions.
A value for games with coalition structures is a mapping ξ that assigns for every N and every v, P ∈ G N × C N a payoff vector ξ(v, P) ∈ IR N . One of the best-known values for games with coalition structures is the Owen value [9] that can be seen as a two-step procedure in which the Shapley value applies twice. Namely, the Owen value assigns to player i ∈ N his Shapley value in the gamev k(i) , i.e.,
while for every a priori union k ∈ M , the gamev k ∈ G N k on player set N k is given bȳ
where, for every S ⊆ N k , the gamev S ∈ G M on the player set M of a priori unions, is defined bŷ
It is well-known that the Owen value is efficient and satisfies the quotient game property which means that for every a priori union the total payoff to the players within that union is determined by applying the Shapley value to the so-called quotient game being the game v P ∈ G M , M = {1, . . . , m}, in which the unions act as individual players,
Notice that for every k ∈ M , the gamev N k is equal to the quotient game v P . Another well-known solution for games with coalition structures is the AumannDrèze value [1] which assigns to every game v, P ∈ G N × C N the payoff vector
The Aumann-Drèze value assigns to a player i the Shapley payoff of player i in the subgame on the coalition N k containing i. Notice that i∈N k AD i (v, P) = v(N k ), and thus
. Therefore the Aumann-Drèze value is not efficient. In fact, according to the Aumann-Drèze value it is assumed that every a priori union is a stand-alone coalition.
Communication graph games
For N ⊂ IN, a communication structure on N is specified by a communication graph N, Γ with Γ ⊆ Γ N = { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i = j}, i.e., Γ is a collection of (unordered) pairs of nodes (players), where a pair {i, j} represents a link between players i, j ∈ N , and N, Γ N is the complete graph on N . Again, for simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write graph Γ instead of N, Γ . Let L N denote the set of all communication graphs on
N constitutes a game with (communication) graph structure or simply a graph game on N . For given N , the subgraph of a graph Γ ∈ L N with respect to
For ease of notation given digraph Γ and link {i, j} ∈ Γ the subgraph Γ\{{i, j}} we denote via Γ| −ij . For a graph Γ on N , a sequence of different nodes
A graph Γ on a player set N is connected , if for any two nodes in N there exists a path in Γ from one node to the other. For given graph Γ on N , we say that the player set S ⊆ N is connected, if the subgraph Γ| S is connected. For graph Γ on player set N and S ⊆ N , a subset T ⊆ S is a maximally connected subset or component of S if (i) Γ| T is connected, and (ii) for every i ∈ S \ T , the subgraph Γ| T ∪{i} is not connected. For Γ on N and S ⊆ N , we denote by S/Γ the set of all components of S, and by (S/Γ) i the component of S containing i ∈ S. Notice that S/Γ is a partition of S.
A value for communication graph games, a graph game value, is a mapping ξ that for every N ⊂ IN and every
for every C ∈ N/Γ. A well-known component efficient graph game value is the Myerson value. Following Myerson [8] , we assume that in a communication graph game v, Γ only connected coalitions are able to cooperate and to realise their worths. A non-connected coalition S can only realise the sum of the worths of its components in S/Γ. This yields the restricted game v Γ ∈ G N defined by
Then the Myerson value for communication graph games is the graph game value µ that assigns to every communication graph game v, Γ the Shapley value of its restricted game
It is well-known that the Myerson value is the unique graph game value that is component efficient and satisfies the so-called Myerson fairness axiom. A graph game value ξ is fair if for every graph game v, Γ on any player set N , for every {h, k} ∈ Γ,
Games with two-level communication structures
We now consider situations in which the players are partitioned into a coalition structure P and are linked to each other by communication graphs. First, there is a communication graph Γ M between the a priori unions M in the partition P. Second, for each a priori union 
C constitutes a game with two-level communication structure or simply two-level graph game on N . A value for games with two-level communication structure, a two-level graph game value, is a mapping ξ that assigns for every N ⊂ IN and every two-level graph game v,
We now state several axioms that can be satisfied by solutions for games with twolevel communication structures. The first three axioms are generalizations of axioms used to characterize the Myerson value on the class of communication graph games. First, quotient component efficiency states that on the level of the a priori unions (in the sequel shortly to be called the upper level), the total payoff of the players in the a priori unions of a component K ∈ M/Γ M is equal to the worth of the unions in the component in the quotient game v P on M .
Quotient component efficiency requires the same as the axiom 'component efficiency in quotient' used in Khmelnitskaya [6] for every non-singleton component K ∈ M/Γ M and every singleton component K = {k}, k ∈ M , for which the corresponding graph Γ k is connected. When K ∈ M/Γ M is a singleton component {k} with Γ k not connected, then the 'component efficiency in quotient' of [6] requires that the total payoff to the players in N k is equal to C∈N k /Γ k v(C), whereas quotient component efficiency still requires that the total payoff to the players in N k is equal to v P ({k}) = v(N k ). So, in this case, for the union N k , [6] requires component efficiency with respect to the within union communication graph Γ k , whereas quotient component efficiency requires efficiency within N k . Notice that the Myerson value of the quotient game v P with respect to Γ M yields payoff v(N k ) to union k when {k} is a singleton component in Γ M . The next axiom applies the well-known Myerson fairness axiom between unions, i.e., it applies fairness on the upper level with respect to the quotient game. If a link {k, h} ∈ Γ M is removed from the graph Γ M on the upper level, then the change in the total payoff to a priori union N k is equal to the change in the total payoff to a priori union N h . For Γ P = Γ M , {Γ k } k∈M and link {k, h} ∈ Γ M , we denote by Γ P | −kh the tuple
Quotient fairness is similar to 'fairness in the quotient' used by Vázquez-Brage et al. [11] , but within the different framework of only one communication graph between all players. The quotient fairness axiom is weaker than the 'between block fairness' of Kongo [7] which not only requires quotient fairness, but also that when in Γ M a link between two unions is deleted, within each of the two unions the change in payoff is the same for all players within that union. In the next section it will be shown that the axioms above uniquely determine the total payoff to every a priori union N k in the coalition structure P, similar as in Myerson [8] for a one-level communication graph. In fact, it follows that the total payoff to coalition N k is equal to the Myerson payoff to union k ∈ M of the quotient game v P with respect to the upper level communication graph Γ M between the unions.
The next two axioms will determine for every k ∈ M the distribution of the total payoff assigned to coalition N k amongst the players in N k . The first one applies the Myerson fairness axiom within the unions, i.e., if a link {i, j} ∈ Γ k is removed from the communication graph Γ k within the union N k , then the change of payoff to player i is equal to the change of payoff to player j.
The union fairness axiom is the same as the 'within block fairness' axiom in Kongo [7] . Quotient fairness requires Myerson fairness on the upper level, while union fairness requires Myerson fairness on the lower level. Also in the '(m + 1)-tuple of deletion link axioms' used in Khmelnitskaya [6] , Myerson fairness can be applied both on the upper level and the lower level. In this case the requirement of (m + 1)-tuple of deletion link axioms in [6] is similar to the total requirement of both quotient fairness and union fairness axioms.
As it was already mentioned before, the total payoff assigned to the players in N k in the quotient game on the upper level has to be fully distributed over the players in N k in the game within the union, also when the communication graph Γ k partitions the union N k into several components. So, within an a priori union N k we have efficiency in the sense that the total payoff assigned to N k is distributed and thus within N k the component efficiency axiom does not hold. The last axiom determines the distribution of the total payoff to N k among the several components of N k in the communication graph 
Notice that this axiom only states a requirement for the distribution of the total payoff within a union N k when N k consists of multiple components with respect to the internal communication graph Γ k , otherwise the requirement reduces to an identity. In case there 1 Note that in this axiom we consider games with two-level communication structures where the player set N is replaced by (N \ N k ) ∪ C. To be precise we therefore need to write such a game as a triple
. Since the player set is clear from the context, we ignore the player set in the notation of a game.
are multiple components, union component balancedness means that the excess (positive or negative), realized by the players of N k when they all cooperate together in the game between the unions (instead of the cooperation within N k being restricted to players within one component of N k /Γ k ) is distributed to the components in proportion to the number of players in the components. In other words, union component balancedness means that considering only the players in component C in Γ k instead of all players in N k , the change in the average payoff of the players in this component is the same as the change in the average payoff of the players in any other component C resulting from considering only the players in that component C in Γ k . It is not difficult to check that considering a component
provides an alternative representation of the union component balancedness axiom.
An Owen-type value for two-level graph games
In this section we first show that there exists a two-level graph game value that satisfies the four axioms. After that we show that this solution is characterized by the four axioms, i.e., it is the unique two-level graph game value satisfying these axioms. Analogously to the Owen value for games with coalition structures, we introduce an Owen-type value for the class of games with two-level communication structures. First, for every k ∈ M and S ⊆ N k , recall the gamev S ∈ G M on the player set M of a priori unions defined by (2.2), where the worth of a coalition Q of a priori unions of M equals the worth of the union of all unions in Q, except that union N k is replaced by S ⊆ N k . We now take into account the communication graph Γ M between the a priori unions. Instead of the gamev k ∈ G N k on player set N k given by (2.1), we now define the game v k ∈ G N k by taking the Myerson value ofv with respect to Γ M instead of the Shapley value ofv. So,
e., the worth of N k in the game v k is equal to the Myerson value of k ∈ M (representing union N k ) in the quotient game with respect to the communication graph Γ M . Next, recall again from Subsection 2.2 that without communication graphs, the Owen value of a player i ∈ N k is the Shapley payoff to player i in the gamev k ∈ G N k . Taking into account the communication graph Γ k within N k , we take for player i ∈ N k its Shapley payoff in a modification of the Myerson restricted game v
The modification concerns the worth of the coalition N k itself, for which we take its own worth v k (N k ) instead of the sum of the worths of components
. This is because the players in N k have to distribute the total payoff assigned to a priori union N k in the restricted quotient game. The value constructed in this way is denoted by ψ, so,
where for all k ∈ M ,ṽ k ∈ G N k is defined bỹ
Analogously to the Owen value, the value ψ can be seen as a two-step procedure in which first every coalition gets its Shapley value of the Myerson restriction of the quotient game with respect to communication graph Γ M , and second every player i in a priori union N k gets its Shapley payoff in the within a priori union gameṽ k ∈ G N k . We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 The two-level graph game value ψ satisfies QCE, QF, UF and UCB.
Proof. QCE. First,
where the first equality follows by definition of ψ, the second equality follows from efficiency of the Shapley value, and the third equality follows from the definition of the Myerson value µ. Thus, we have
where the first equality follows from (4.3) and the second equality follows from component efficiency of µ. QF. We have
where the first and third equality follow from (4.3), and the second equality follows by fairness of µ. UF. By definitioñ
where w ∈ G N k(i) is given by
. From this it follows that
where the first equality follows by definition of the value ψ, the second equality follows from additivity of the Shapley value and (4.4), and the third equality follows by definition of µ andṽ
where the first and third equality follow from (4.5), and the second equality follows by fairness of µ.
2 It is well known [10] that the collection of unanimity games {u T } T ⊆N T =∅ , defined as u T (S) = 1, if T ⊆ S, and u T (S) = 0 otherwise, create a basis in G N .
UCB. By (4.5), we obtain for every
where the first and second equality follow from the definition of ψ, efficiency of the Shapley value and C being the only component in Γ k , and the third equality follows from component efficiency of µ. Thus
Similarly, we can derive
Hence it follows that 1 c
showing that ψ satisfies UCB. 2
Remark Note that (4.5) gives an alternative definition of the value ψ assigning to every graph game its Myerson value and distributing the difference between the worth of the grand coalition N and the sum of the worths of all components equally over all players. In this sense ψ can be seen as combining elements of the Myerson value and equal division solution. This idea is similar to Kamijo [5] who introduced a solution for games in coalition structure that allocates to every player its Shapley value in the game restricted to its own union and distributes the excess of the Shapley value of its union in the (quotient) game between the unions over the worth of this union equally among the players in this union.
The next theorem characterizes the value ψ as the unique solution satisfying the four axioms. 
as the total payoff to the players in the union N k , k = 1, . . . , m. Suppose that solution ξ satisfies the four axioms. We determine the individual payoffs in three steps.
Step 1. We determine the 'union payoffs' in the game (v, Γ P ) ∈ G N × L N C with Γ P = Γ M , {Γ h } h∈M by induction on the number of links in Γ M in a similar way as uniqueness of the Myerson value for one-level graph games is shown in Myerson [8] . When |Γ M | = 0 then, for all k ∈ M , the set of neighboring unions {h ∈ M | {h, k} ∈ Γ} = ∅, and thus
Proceeding by induction, assume that the values ξ k (v, Γ P ) have been determined
Q, Γ is connected and Q, Γ\{k, h} is not connected for all {k, h} ∈ Γ. So, the number of links in Γ is q − 1. By QF, for all {k, h} ∈ Γ it holds that
Moreover, by QCE it holds that
Since |Γ M \{h, k}| = |Γ M | − 1, it follows by the induction hypothesis that all the values ξ k (v, Γ P | −kh ), {k, h} ∈ Γ, have been determined, and thus (4.6) and (4.7) yield q linear equations in the q unknown payoffs ξ k (v, Γ P ), k ∈ Q. Since these equations are linearly independent, for every Q ∈ M/Γ, all payoffs ξ k (v, Γ P ), k ∈ Q, are uniquely determined.
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Step 2. Second, similarly as in Step 1, we determine for every k ∈ M , for every subset C ⊂ N k the 'union payoffs' in the game (v C 
) is the total payoff to the players in
3 Note that in the proof of the induction step, every possible spanning tree Γ yields the same solution for the values ξ k (v, Γ P ), k ∈ Q, because otherwise a solution does not exist, which contradicts Theorem 4.1.
Step 3. Third, we determine the individual payoffs in every coalition
From
Step 1 and 2 above, we know ξ k (v, Γ P ) and
Now we proceed by induction similar as in Step 1, but first we show that for each component C ∈ N k /Γ k the total payoff to the players in C is uniquely determined. The payoff ξ k (v, Γ P ) to the a priori union N k has been determined already in Step 1, so
If N k is the unique component in N k /Γ k , then UCB does not state any requirement. When N k /Γ k consists of multiple components, then for every component C ∈ N k /Γ k , UCB states that
Notice that every payoff ξ k in this equation has been determined in either Step 1 or Step 2. We now prove the induction step similar as in Step 1, and as in [8] . Let Γ P denote the two-level graph structure Γ M , {Γ h } h∈M with Γ h = Γ h if h = k and Γ k = Γ for some graph Γ on N k . Above we already showed that the payoffs in N k are determined if |Γ k | = 0. Now, assume that the values ξ i (v, Γ P ) have been determined for every Γ with |Γ | < |Γ k |.
If C ⊆ N k is a singleton set {i}, then the payoff ξ i (v, Γ P ) of the single player i ∈ C follows from (4.10). If c = |C| ≥ 2, then there exists a spanning tree Γ ⊆ Γ k | C on C. So, the number of links in Γ is c − 1. By UF, for all {i, j} ∈ Γ it holds that
Since |Γ k \{i, j}| = |Γ k |−1, it follows by the induction hypothesis that all payoffs ξ i (v, Γ P | k −ij ), {i, j} ∈ Γ, have been determined. If C = N k then the equations (4.10) and (4.11) yield c linearly independent equations in the c unknown payoffs ξ i (v, Γ P ), i ∈ C. If C = N k then the equations (4.9) and (4.11) yield c linearly independent equations in the c unknown payoffs ξ i (v, Γ P ), i ∈ C. Hence, for every C ∈ N k /Γ k , all payoffs ξ i (v, Γ P ), i ∈ C, are uniquely determined.
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Note that in the proof of Theorem 4.2 we used QCE and QF to determine the sum of the payoffs in every union, similar as done in [8] . In fact, we considered Γ M as a one-level graph on M . We cannot apply a similar proof using component efficiency to determine the individual payoffs inside each union, because the total payoff to the players in each union should be equal to the total payoff to the union as determined in Step 1, which could be more (or less) than the sum of the payoffs that the components of the communication graph within the union obtain in the internal game. Instead, we applied UCB to obtain uniqueness on the individual level.
We conclude this section by showing that the four axioms are logically independent.
1.
[Equal division within the a priori unions] Let the two-level graph game value ξ (1) assign for every v,
to every player i ∈ N k , k ∈ M . This value divides for each a priori union k ∈ M the worth v k (N k ) of coalition N k in the restricted quotient game equally amongst the players in N k . It satisfies quotient component efficiency, quotient fairness and union fairness but does not satisfy union component balancedness.
[Equal division within the components of the a priori unions]
Let the twolevel graph game value ξ (2) assign for every v,
Each player i ∈ C ∈ N k /Γ k gets an equal share in the worthṽ k (C) of his component and an equal share in the surplus of N k over the sum of the worths of the components in N k /Γ k . This value satisfies quotient component efficiency, quotient fairness and union component balancedness but it does not satisfy union fairness.
3.
[Equal division within the components of the upper-level structure] Let the two-level graph game value ξ (3) be defined for every v,
where for a priori union k ∈ M belonging to a component K ∈ M/Γ M of the upperlevel structure, the game w k ∈ G N k is defined by
In this case every a priori union N k gets an equal share in the worth of the component to which it belongs in the upper level structure. This value satisfies quotient component efficiency, union fairness and union component balancedness but it does not satisfy quotient fairness.
4.
[Efficient total payoff distribution] Let the two-level graph game value ξ (4) be defined for every v,
where for a priori union k ∈ M w * k ∈ G N k is defined by
In this case the total payoff is equal to the worth v(N ) of the grand coalition N of all players, i.e., ξ (4) is efficient. This value ξ (4) satisfies quotient fairness, union fairness and union component balancedness but it does not satisfy quotient component efficiency.
Comparison with other values
In this final section we consider several special cases of two-level structure Γ P and its corresponding Owen-type value ψ and show that, for example the Owen value, AumannDrèze value (for games in coalition structure), Myerson value (for communication graph games) and equal surplus division solutions can be obtained as special cases of this value. We distinguish two types of values, one depending on special communication graphs, and the other depending on special partitions.
Special communication graphs
Two special cases of a communication graph are the complete and the empty graph. In this paper these two special cases can occur both on the upper level between the unions as on the lower level within the unions. We first discuss three special cases with an empty graph on the upper level and next three special cases with a complete graph on the upper level.
1.
[Empty upper level structure, complete graph within the unions: The Aumann-Drèze value] Consider the case Γ P with Γ M the empty graph and every Γ k , k ∈ M , the complete graph. In this case every a priori union N k stands alone and the Myerson value applied to the quotient game with empty communication graph assigns to every a priori union N k , k ∈ M , its own payoff v(N k ). In the game v k on N k every coalition S ⊂ N k gets its own worth v(S), thus v k (S) = v(S) for every S ⊆ N k , k ∈ M . Within the union there is no restriction on the cooperation between the players and thusṽ k (S) = v(S) for every S ⊆ N k , k ∈ M . It follows that
i.e., every player i gets its Shapley value within the subgame of v on the a priori union N k containing i, and therefore, in this case the value ψ is equal to the Aumann-Drèze value [1] .
2.
[Empty two-level structure: Equal surplus division] Consider the case Γ P with both Γ M and every Γ k , k ∈ M , empty. As in the previous case every a priori coalition N k , k ∈ M , stands alone and gets its own worth v(N k ). Next, within a priori union N k every player i is a stand alone component andṽ k ({i}) = v({i}) for every i ∈ N k . Then it follows from union component balancedness that for every k ∈ M and i ∈ N k ,
So, in this case the value ψ assigns within each a priori union N k the equal surplus division solution on the subgame v| N k , first considered in Driessen and Funaki [4] under the name of the center of the imputation set (CIS-value). In case v is zeronormalized, and thus v({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N , the value ψ yields the equal division solution within each a priori union N k .
3.
[Empty upper level structure, connected graphs within the unions: The Myerson value] Consider the case Γ P with Γ M the empty graph and every Γ k , k ∈ M , connected, i.e., for every k ∈ M , union N k itself is the only element in N k /Γ k . Again every a priori union N k , k ∈ M , stands alone and gets its own worth v(N k ) and in the game v k every coalition S ⊂ N k gets its own worth v(S), thus On the other hand, within an a priori union N k every player i ∈ N k is a stand alone component. Withṽ k ({i}) =v k ({i}) for all i ∈ N k , andṽ k (N k ) =v k (N k ) = Sh k (v P ) the Shapley value of a priori union k in the quotient game, it follows from union component balancedness that, for every k ∈ M and i ∈ N k
So, within a priori union N k every player i gets its stand alone value in the gamev k plus an equal share in the surplus of N k in the quotient game.
6.
[Complete upper level structure, connected graphs within the unions: The efficient Myerson-type value of Casajus [3] ] Consider the case Γ P with Γ M the complete graph and every Γ k , k ∈ M , connected. Again v k (S) =v k (S) for all k ∈ M and S ⊆ N k . Because of connectedness of every Γ k , the value ψ is obtained by applying within every a priori union N k the Myerson value µ to v k =v k with respect to Γ k , so for every k ∈ M and i ∈ N k ,
Furthermore, every Γ k is connected and by definition (2.1) ofv,v
Then from the efficiency of the Shapley value it follows that for every k, i∈N k ψ i (v, Γ P ) = Sh k (v P ) and i∈N ψ i (v, Γ P ) = k∈M Sh k (v P ) = v(N ). So ψ distributes the total worth v(N ) and thus meets efficiency.
In fact, in this case the two-level graph game value ψ yields the same payoffs as the socalled CO-value φ, introduced in Theorem 4.2 of Casajus [3] as an efficient alternative for the Myerson value for games with a one-level communication graph. For such a game v, Γ with Γ a communication graph on N , [3] considers the collection N/Γ of components of Γ as a cooperation structure P induced by the communication structure Γ. Let N k be such a component. Then, within N k the Shapley value is applied to the Myerson restricted game ofv k . This gives the same payoffs as ψ(v, Γ P ) for the two-level structure when Γ M is taken to be the complete graph on M and for each k ∈ M graphs Γ k are connected. In this case the Casajus's graph Γ = ∪ k∈M Γ k .
Special coalition structures
Finally we discuss the two special cases with respect to the coalition structure. It appears that this is the unique value that satisfies union fairness (within the grand coalition N ) and efficiency. Considering this case as just a one-level communication graph game v, Γ on N , recall that the Myerson value is the unique value that satisfies component efficiency and fairness. In fact, in case of P = {N } the value ψ yields the same payoffs as the efficient Myerson-type value of the game v, Γ for games with one-level communication graphs, recently studied in van den Brink, Khmelnitskaya, and van der Laan [2] .
